There are roughly two reasons philosophers who have realistic views about
other properties (i.e., those not sympathetic to idealism or nominalism about
properties in general) have been attracted to color irrealism. First, some have
begun with the conviction that the only real properties are those recognized by
science, and have rejected color realism on the ground that red,
blue, and the like do not appear in the inventory of properties
recognized by the sciences.
Among realist theories of color, we may distinguish sense-data theories, on
which colors are properties of the mental entities that are the immediate
objects of perception, and what might be called externalist theories, according
to which colors are properties of ordinary external objects --- the tables,
coffee cups, and hippopotami that populate the extra-mental world. Sense-data
theories have a long and venerable tradition in empiricist theorizing about
perception and knowledge, and have been defended in such contemporary works as
[Jackson, 1977] and [Perkins, 1983]. However, many philosophers remain
unconvinced about both the ultimate tenability of the ontology of sense-data and
their necessity in understanding perception.
Among externalist accounts of color, we may distinguish between those that
take colors to be intrinsic --- henceforth, intrinsic theories --- and those
that take colors to be relational properties --- henceforth, relational
theories.
Intrinsic theorists, who understand colors as intrinsic properties of
external objects, think that colors are objective and mind-independent; in
particular, they insist that colors are not constituted in terms of relations to
subjects or minds. A typical account of this sort is one that takes colors to be
physical properties --- usually some kind of reflectance property of surfaces,
transmittance property of transparent surfaces and volumes, emittance property
of luminous sources, or some combination of these. However, other versions of
intrinsic theories are possible as well; for example, one might hold that colors
are intrinsic but non-physical (whatever that comes to), or intrinsic but
unanalyzable (a fortiori not susceptible of analysis in terms of physical
kinds). That said, the prevailing intrinsic accounts of colors take them to be
physical, and this has encouraged writers to discuss these accounts under a
variety of seemingly non-equivalent labels, including `color objectivism',
`color physicalism', and (adverting to the distinction among primary and
secondary qualities of matter adumbrated by modern philosophers such as Galileo,
Boyle, and Locke) 'primary quality theory of color'.
In opposition to these views, relational theories have it that colors are
constituted in terms of relations between objects and subjects, and therefore
proponents of these views deny that colors are objective and mind-independent in
the sense in which intrinsic theorists think they are. A standard relational
account, often associated with Locke, holds that colors are dispositions to
cause certain sensations in certain kinds of minds; for example, on one version
of this theory, red is the disposition to look red to normal observers. This
view -- henceforth color dispositionalism -- understands colors as what the
modern philosophers mentioned above would regard as secondary qualities, and
therefore has come to be known as a secondary quality theory of color.
Still, dispositionalism is not the only relational theory of color. Another
is the functionalist view, defended by [Jackson, 1998c], [McLaughlin, 1999b],
and [Cohen, 2000], that colors are the properties that dispose their bearers to
cause particular types of sensations in certain kinds of minds. Functionalism is
in many respects closely related to dispositionalism, but the two views cannot
be identified: functionalists say that colors are the properties in virtue of
which things have their dispositions to look colored, not the dispositions
themselves, while dispositionalists identify colors with the dispositions in
question.
... suppose a given range of objects look systematically red to us and systematically green to Martians, and suppose our and their colour discriminations are equally fine. Then there will be no choosing between these groups of perceivers in respect of whose experience determines the colour of the objects in question ([McGinn, 1983], 9--10).The idea, then, is that perceptual variation in respect of shape does not show that shape is relational because we have objective, observer-independent, well-motivated (geometric) criteria for deciding whether something is an instance of a certain shape (for example, it is square just in case it has four right interior angles and sides of equal length), and this justifies us saying that a perceiver's perception that x is a square is correct just in case x meets the (independently certified --- in this case, geometrically certified) conditions that are necessary and sufficient for being a square. In contrast, the suggestion goes, there is no independent standard on the strength of which we can choose among the perceptual variants in respect of color, since there is no motivated, independent standard that we could use to select from among the variants. If this is correct -- if there is no ground for ruling out any of the perceptual variants, then x could be red for me and fail to be red for you, or look red to me under one viewing condition and fail to look red to me under another viewing condition. Of course, this is just to say that red is not an intrinsic property of objects, but is some sort of relation between objects, perceivers, and viewing conditions; and this, in turn, is just to say that red is a relational property.
The line of argument in favor of relationalism sketched above turns crucially on the claim that, unlike the case of shape properties, there is no perceiver-independent, well-motivated standard for choosing among the perceptual variants with respect to color properties. This claim, however, has seemed dubious to some. After all, one might suggest, there are several scientific and industrial recipes for deciding which among a range of observers is correct in her color judgments, and which among a range of viewing conditions is appropriate for making correct color judgments. Therefore, an anti-relationalist might think that she could appeal to these recipes as a way of blocking the argument for relationalism sketched above. Unfortunately, there are several reasons for thinking that these recipes won't serve the philosophical purposes to which an anti-relationalist might hope to put them.
Consider the recipes for selecting among perceivers first. First, as noted in
([Hardin, 1988], 76--82), the scientific and industrial specifications that have
been articulated are typically statistical constructs over a range of distinct
actual individuals, but that differ significantly from most (perhaps as many as
90% of) human visual systems;
Analogous considerations prevent us from choosing a standard for viewing
conditions, even though there are scientific and industrial recipes for standard
conditions (cf. [American Society for Testing and Materials, 1968], [Judd and
Wyszecki, 1963], [Kelly and Judd, 1976], [Wyszecki and Stiles, 1967]). To see
why, consider a notion of standard conditions based on one such recipe -- the
instructions for the Munsell color chips.
If the Munsell-inspired proposal fails because of the wide range of
ecologically valid situations in which we want to talk about colors, a natural
suggestion would be to divide objects into different types, and then specify
standard conditions for each type. Thus, on such a proposal, we could specify
separately standard conditions (i.e., conditions appropriate for veridical color
judgments) for opaque surface colors, volume colors, film colors, self-luminous
colors, and so on. However, this procedure, too, runs into trouble quickly.
Consider just surface color, for example. It is well known that, because of
contrast effects, a given surface patch looks different in respect of color to a
given observer as a function of the region surrounding the patch. We can
eliminate such effects if we specify that the standard conditions include
viewing the patch through a reduction tube; however, this choice will have
untoward consequences. First, it will follow that surfaces in the vast majority
of ecologically valid settings will not look to the vast majority of
ecologically valid observers to have the colors they in fact have; this by
itself seems a rather ad hoc sacrifice of plausibility in the service of an
unmotivated preference for specificity. Second, (as a limiting case of the first
problem) a specification relying on the use of reduction tubes will have the
consequence that, necessarily, nothing could ever have any of the contrast
colors --- colors that cannot appear in the absence of contrast --- such as
brown, olive, pure white, and pure black. I suggest that a theory of color on
which it is necessary that nothing is brown, olive, pure black, or pure white,
is not a theory we should endorse (at least not without first demanding a
compelling argument). Furthermore, contrast effects are not the only worries;
how a surface looks to a given subject depends also on the choice of magnitudes
for such values as size and resolution the field of view --- choices for which
there are no obviously principled criteria.
It seems, then, that the standardized specifications of standard condition that are designed for use in particular laboratory or industrial purposes are not adequate to our needs. And once again, since such scientific and industrial standards are our best motivated candidates, it seems unreasonably optimistic to think that a more successful specification of standard conditions is in the offing.
To summarize, perceptual variations in color have encouraged relational theorists because it has seemed to them that there is no principled way to select among the variants --- to claim that one of the variants is correct, at the expense of all the rest. On the other hand, there is dramatic perceptual variation in respect of color: x can look red to me but fail to look red to you, and x can look red to one observer in one viewing circumstance but not in another. But if there is this range of variation, and if there is no principled ground for choosing between the variants, then it seems difficult to resist the conclusion that x is red for me and also that the very same x is not red for you, and that x is red for me in one viewing conditions but not in another. And this is just to say that red is a relational rather than an intrinsic property of x.
To state the fineness objection as generally as possible, let us understand a metameric pair for some intrinsic theory of color as a pair of stimuli that differ in respect of their colors as colors are understood by that intrinsic theory, but that are perceptual matches for a given observer and a given viewing condition. The members of a metameric pair, then, will be perceptual matches for a certain observer under a certain viewing condition, even though one of them has and the other one of them lacks a particular color property, as color properties are understood by that intrinsic theory. Whether or not there exist metameric pairs in this sense, of course, depends on the details of the intrinsic theory under consideration. However, it is clear that, if we understand color properties as surface spectral reflectance distributions (as on the most prevalent current intrinsic accounts of color) there are metameric pairs for any illuminant. The worry raised by such pairs, of course, is that their color is not distinguished by ordinary perception, even though it is distinguished by some intrinsic theory of color; in other words, such theories seem to individuate colors more finely than perception, and therefore (according to the objector) more finely than is appropriate.
One response to this objection on behalf of the intrinsic theorist rejects the objector's implicit assumption that ordinary perception provides the appropriate criterion for individuating colors. On this line of response, we accept that the theory individuates colors more finely than ordinary perception (finer than red and blue, for example), but simply deny that the individuative standards of ordinary perception carry any authority --- we insist that ordinary perception fails to mark real distinctions among colors. That is, on this view, red, blue, and the like are not themselves colors, but superordinate categories each of which subsumes many distinct colors that should be distinguished by an adequate theory of color.
However, one might wonder whether this response is a bit unmotivated, as it stands. It is tempting to answer that we began the project with the hope of understanding the nature of red, blue, and the like --- properties that are detected and individuated by ordinary perception: if a theory of color tells us that red is not a color but a superordinate of many colors, then it is providing an analysis of something other than our initial target. On the other hand, the intrinsic theorist might respond, this may be one of the cases where a new understanding of the facts genuinely warrants a reconfiguration of the aims of a scientific theory: this is no more ad hoc, she might suggest, than the (presumably warranted) determination that ichthyology should exclude the study of whales, insofar as whales are not fish. Of course, what warrants these proposed theoretical reconfigurations (when they are warranted) is the possibility of providing them with independent motivation in terms of the methodology and taxonomy of the field of study. When such motivation can be supplied (as, I take it, it can be in the case of the exclusion of whales from the domain of ichthyology), there is no reason to object that the reconfiguration is an ad hoc maneuver designed only to avoid charges of inappropriate individuation. What is needed to sustain the intrinsic theorist's response, then, is such a theory-neutral motivation for individuating colors more finely than by the standards of perceptual matches.
Just such a motivation is offered in [Hilbert, 1987], chapter 5. Hilbert's
motivation turns on the fact that, when members of a metameric pair are
perceptual matches (for an observer) under one illuminant I1, they must be
perceptual mismatches (for that observer) under some different illuminant I2.
What are the structural relations holding among the colors that form the
cornerstone of the argument from structure? The first set of relations involves
the set of similarity and exclusion relations among the colors; following
[Johnston, 1992], I shall refer to these as 'unity relations'. For example, one
of the unity relations is that red is more similar to orange than it is to blue;
another is that no shade of yellow is a shade of blue; others include that red
and green, orange and blue, and yellow and purple are pairs of maximally
dissimilar hues. By gathering all such relations, we can construct a Quinean
similarity space of the colors, and assign to each color a place in this space.
A second set of structural relations among the colors involves the idea that
there are precisely six phenomenally elementary colors, which are experienced as
being perceptually unmixed: red, green, blue, yellow, black, and white (of
these, we are particularly interested in the four chromatic colors red, green,
blue, and yellow). That is, there is a shade of red which is experienced as not
at all bluish and not at all yellowish, there is a shade of green which is
experienced as not at all bluish and not at all yellowish, there is a shade of
blue which is experienced as not at all reddish and not at all yellowish, and
there is a shade of yellow which is experienced as not at all reddish and not at
all greenish. In contrast, the vast majority of colors are experienced as being
mixed: for example, no shade of orange is experienced as not at all reddish and
not at all yellowish, and no shade of violet is experienced as being not at all
bluish and not at all reddish. Indeed, even for the colors which have unmixed
shades, most shades will be experienced as mixed: thus, although there is an
unmixed shade of red, most shades of red are experienced as being somewhat
yellowish or somewhat bluish. Colors experienced as perceptually unmixed are
called unique; the others are called binary.
The argument from structure, then, alleges that colors have certain structural properties (they are organized by the unity relations, they admit of a distinction between unique and binary) that the intrinsic properties proposed as identical to the colors lack, and therefore that the colors cannot be identical to those intrinsic properties.
Several answers to the argument from structure have been proposed. For example, Tye proposes that the unique/binary distinction among colors is nothing but a set of associations with the colors that we learn when we discover how various pigments combine (e.g., by mixing paints in kindergarten; see [Tye, 1995], 148). Since there is nothing to block the association of such learned categories with the intrinsic properties identified with colors by intrinsic theories, the thought is that there could be a unique/binary distinction for intrinsic properties, so the alleged distinction between colors and such intrinsic properties would evaporate. Unfortunately, this proposal is implausible for empirical reasons. First, evidence that the unique/binary distinction made by (pre-kindergarten) pre-linguistic infants and non-human primates ([Hardin, 1988], 40ff, [Teller and Bornstein, 1987], [Hardin, 1997], 293--294) suggests that the distinction in question is not learned at all (a fortiori, not learned in the way that Tye suggests it is learned). Second, since kindergarten experimentation informs us that blue and yellow pigments combine to form green pigment, Tye's proposal would have the erroneous consequence that green is binary. For these reasons, it seems that Tye's proposal fails to capture the unique/binary distinction that applies to colors.
A different attempt at answering the argument from structure occurs in
([Hilbert, 1987], 117-118), where Hilbert defines a similarity metric over
spectral reflectance distributions intended to preserve the facts of unity.
Hilbert's proposal builds on the (plausible) assumption that the perceived
similarity or difference between two colors must be understood as a similarity
or difference in respect of how those two colors affect at least one of the
types of photoreceptors in our eyes. There are three such types of receptors in
human beings with normal color vision (S-cones, M-cones, and L-cones), and we
can represent the (overlapping) regions of the electromagnetic spectrum to which
these receptors are sensitive as R
However, while these attempts by intrinsic theorists to answer the argument
from structure are unsuccessful, I think there is an alternative, and more
compelling, response that can be given on behalf of the intrinsic theorist. The
key to this line of response is the idea that we may regard the structural
properties of the colors primarily as structural properties of color
experiences, and only derivatively as structural properties of the colors
themselves.
The data supporting the claims about the facts of unity and the unique/binary
distinction come from subjects' judgments about the colors. Presumably the
subjects who make these judgments are perceiving the colored stimuli presented
to them; and, however we ultimately understand this process, it seems that
perceiving colored stimuli is at least correlated with undergoing token color
experiences. Indeed, it is plausible that subjects' similarity judgments about
colors are made on the basis of phenomenal similarities between the color
experiences that accompany their color perceptions.
Moreover, notice that, while the intrinsic theorist insists on distinguishing between colors (according to her, intrinsic properties of surfaces and the like) and color experiences (mental states that are, according to her, metaphysically independent of the color properties), she will surely agree that color properties are the de facto bases for the dispositions to cause color experiences. That is, the intrinsic theorist will say that a tomato's redness is not constituted by its relation to color experiences, but she will readily admit that the tomato's color is (contingently) the material basis for its disposition to cause red experiences in perceivers.
Given that the intrinsic theorist will allow this relation between the colors and color experiences, and given that color experiences have the structural properties of unity and the unique/binary distinction, the intrinsic theorist can now provide analogous properties for the colors themselves, thereby answering the argument from structure. For she may construct the structural properties of the colors by deriving them from the structural properties of the color experiences the dispositions to produce which the colors are the bases. Viz., the intrinsic theorist may say that red is unique and that orange is not because the former is the basis for the disposition to produce a unique color experience (a red experience) while the latter is the basis for the disposition to produce a binary color experience (an orange experience). Similarly, she can hold that red is more similar to orange than it is to green because these intrinsic color properties are bases for the dispositions to produce red, orange, and green experiences, and because the experiences stand in the phenomenal similarity relations they do.
It seems to me that this explanatory strategy should count as a satisfactory reply to the argument from structure on behalf of the intrinsic theorist.
Obviously, one way in which a relationalist might respond to the accusation
that her view runs roughshod over the phenomenology of color is to deny that
phenomenology is authoritative about whether colors are relational or not. Such
a denial could take either one of two forms. First, a relationalist could hold
that color phenomenology is silent with respect to the relationality (or
otherwise) of colors.
Both of these responses require denying a thesis (helpfully dubbed
'Revelation' in [Johnston, 1992]) to the effect that the phenomenology of color
provides an authoritative, complete, and incorrigible understanding of color.
But Revelation has seemed attractive to many theorists; for example, Russell
tells us that, "the particular shade of colour that I am seeing... may have many
things to be said about it.... But such statements, though they make me know
truths about the colour, do not make me know the colour itself better than I did
before: so far as concerns knowledge of the colour itself, as opposed to
knowledge of truths about it, I know the color perfectly and completely when I
see it and no further knowledge of it itself is even theoretically possible"
([Russell, 1912], 47).
Thus, a number of relationalists have answered the phenomenological objection simply by stating their dissatisfaction with Revelation. Unfortunately, this sort of answer will not mollify an anti-relationalist, for she will insist that the phenomenological objection survives the denial of Revelation. After all, she might suggest, the objection doesn't require (as per Revelation) that phenomenology is authoritative about the entire nature of color; all that she needs for her objection is that the phenomenology of color is correct in its presentation of colors as monadic. And now the question is what independent motivation we have for accepting or denying this particular deliverance from color phenomenology.
I believe that the relationalist can provide independent motivation for
denying the particular phenomenological impression that colors are monadic by
showing that there is a similar impression of monadicity connected with other
properties that are less controversially relational. The thought is that if an
impression of monadicity is compatible with relationality in the case of
properties other than color, then we should not trust the inference from the
impression of monadicity to the conclusion of non-relationality in the special
case of color properties either.
Consider, then, the property too heavy to lift. As I go around in the world I judge that certain things are too heavy to lift, and others are not. Because I constantly make these judgments against the background of my own (relatively stable over time) strength and physical build and in the context of a relatively unchanging gravitational field (the field is relatively unchanging because I will hold it fixed as much as I can for purposes of judging whether objects are too heavy to lift), my classifications seem reasonably stable from occasion to occasion, and therefore I have no reason to suspect that too heavy to lift is anything but a monadic property of objects. A moment's thought, however, should convince us that too heavy to lift is a relation between objects and subjects (and gravitational fields). Here, too heavy to lift initially seems monadic, even though it is not, because the relative stability of all but one of the relata (only the object changes, while the lifter and the gravitational field remain fixed) prevent us from seeing the relevance of the other relata.
The relationalist about color will say the same thing about color properties that was just said about too heavy to lift. To wit: As I go around in the world I judge that certain things are red, and others are not. Because I constantly make attributions of redness against the background of my own (relatively stable over time) perceptual apparatus and in the context of relatively unchanging perceptual circumstances (the perceptual circumstances are relatively unchanging because I will hold them fixed as much as I can for purposes of judging whether objects are red), my classifications seem reasonably stable from occasion to occasion, and therefore I have no reason to suspect that red is anything but a monadic property of objects. A moment's thought, however, should convince us that red is a relation between objects and subjects (and perceptual circumstances). Here, red initially seems monadic, even though it is not, because the relative stability of all but one of the relata (only the object changes, while the viewer and the perceptual circumstances remain fixed) prevent us from seeing the relevance of the other relata.
If the foregoing is plausible, then we should be unsurprised to find that phenomenology can mislead us about the relationality or non-relationality of various properties. And if this is correct, then we should not allow the phenomenological intuition that colors are monadic to prevent us from endorsing a relational understanding of color.
When you look at an object you do not see (de dicto) its dispositions to act in certain ways in certain circumstances, but you do see what color it is. Here, of course, I mean direct object perception, not just seeing-that --- seeing the property itself, not merely seeing that it is instantiated. You may see that something is soluble by watching it dissolve, but you do not see its solubility --- that property itself. You can see the manifestation of the disposition, and you may also see the categorical basis of the disposition in the object's molecular structure, but your eyes do not acquaint you with the property of being disposed to dissolve.... And now the point about colors is that they enter the very content of primitive visual experience, being part of how objects appear, but dispositions of whatever kind cannot themselves enter visual content in this way ([McGinn, 1996], 540; cf. [Mackie, 1976], chapter 1).Although McGinn's formulation of this objection is directed against dispositionalism, it seems clear that the worry is applicable to any relational view: if colors are possible direct objects of seeing, then any relational account of color will be threatened by the worry that relations (as opposed to relata) cannot be direct objects of seeing.
In fact, McGinn had already considered and offered a response to this objection in his earlier defense of dispositionalism ([McGinn, 1983], 133-135). This response (which McGinn disavows in [McGinn, 1996], but which is taken up in [McLaughlin, 1999b]) involves the contention that 'sees' introduces a hyperintensional context (similarly for 'looks') --- one where sameness of sense and reference does not guarantee intersubstitutability salva veritate. If this is right, then one could accept the dispositionalist's proposed analytic equivalence between 'red' and 'the disposition to look red', and then explain the divergence in truth value between 'I see red' and 'I see the disposition to look red' as a consequence of the hyperintensionality of the main verb 'see' (mutatis mutandis for other relational accounts, such as functionalism).
Unfortunately, this answer strikes me as unconvincing: while it is plausible that 'looks' may introduce a hyperintensional context, it seems (at least, to my linguistic intuition) not only that the context created by 'sees' is not hyperintensional, but that it is extensional. If so, the hyperintensionality proposal cannot speak to the present objection, which concerns whether colors can be the direct object of 'sees'.
On the other hand, I do not believe that McGinn's objection against
relational views is decisive. For the relationalist might well insist that, if
colors are relations, then they are relations that (unlike solubility)
can be the direct objects of seeing. For simplicity, I'll discuss this point
only in terms of dispositional versions of relationalism, but the response can
be generalized. The objection we are discussing allows that manifestations of
dispositions can be direct objects of seeing, but insists that dispositions
themselves cannot; for example, while we can see (in the direct object sense) a
dissolution, we cannot see (in the direct object sense) solubility. However,
this might be thought to overlook relevant differences between dispositions,
some of which can be the direct object of seeing, and some of which cannot.
Namely, one might hold that a disposition can be a direct object of seeing if it
is a disposition whose manifestation is a visual experience. For in that case,
when the disposition manifests, what happens is constitutive of seeing the
disposition. Of course, dispositionalists believe that, if red is a
disposition, it is a disposition whose manifestation is a visual experience.
Consequently, on the view suggested, they can explain how red is visible,
even if that property is a disposition.
The causal argument just reviewed, of course, depends on the premise that
dispositions are causally inert. While there are a handful of arguments for this
conclusion in the literature, Jackson has tended to rely in his writings on the
topic on an explanatory exclusion argument familiar from debates about higher
level causation.
Consider... a fragile glass that shatters on being dropped because it is fragile, and not (say) because of some peculiarity in the way it is dropped. Suppose that it is a certain kind of bonding B between the glass molecules which is responsible for the lass being such that if dropped, it breaks. But then it is bonding B, together with the dropping, that causes the breaking; there is nothing left for the ... disposition itself, to do. All the causal work is done by bonding B in concert with the dropping. To admit the fragility also as a cause of the breaking would be to admit a curious, ontologically extravagant kind of overdetermination ([Jackson, 1998c], lecture 4).
[McFarland and Miller, 1998] have responded to this argument by suggesting
that Jackson is unjustified in thinking that the "causal work" done by the
disposition is redundant with the "causal work" done by the basis for the
disposition. As they point out, it is plausible to understand the disposition's
causal efficacy as a complex, derivative sort of causal efficacy, constituted,
in part, by the causal efficacy of its basis. Indeed, Jackson himself has
provided such a derivative notion of causal efficacy for higher-level properties
in [Jackson and Pettit, 1988], so it is especially ironic that he should make
this sort of argument against dispositionalism.
1. This appears to be at least part of the motivation
behind Democritus's famous exhortation that "by convention color exists, by
convention bitter, by convention sweet but in reality atoms and void." Something
like this argument has been propounded more recently in ([Aune, 1967], 172).
2. This is the route to irrealism pursued in [Hardin, 1988]
and [Maund, 1995]. See [Stroud, 2000] for arguments against these and other
forms of color irrealism.
3. One of the more compelling recent cases against
sense-data construed specifically as the bearers of color properties occurs in
([Hardin, 1988], 96-109).
4. This is not an orthodox criterion for sorting theories
of color, but I think it is more useful than the more familiar alternatives: as
I shall point out below, more traditional ways of classifying theories of color
seem to me to run together a number of orthogonal issues.
5. Care should be used with these terms, since different
authors use them differently. This is one respect in which the traditional
terminology for sorting theories of color seems to me to be unsatisfactory.
6. Again, caution with this terminology is in order, since
philosophers have meant a number of different things by the technical expression
'secondary quality'.
7. Nor should functionalism be thought of as an intrinsic
account of colors: functionalists think colors are not particular intrinsic
structures, but the second order properties of having some or other structures
in virtue of which their bearers are related to observers in a certain way.
Consequently, functionalists claim that colors are constituted in terms of
relations to observers, and therefore should count as defenders of a relational
view. For more on these themes, see [Cohen, 2000].
8. [Lewis, 1997] argues that the circularity in the offing
here is not vicious, and therefore that one can hold both a relational account
of color properties and a relational account of color experiences. I cannot
examine this matter here for reasons of space.
9. See ([Evans, 1948], 196-197).
10. As an alternative to relying on the scientific and
industrial recipes, some have proposed deferring to the perceptual variant
exemplified in the largest subgroup of subjects in the population. The by-now
standard argument against this proposal, which I believe originates in
([Bennett, 1968], 105-107) involves phenol, which apparently tastes bitter to
about seventy percent of the population and is tasteless to about thirty percent
of the population. Is phenol bitter or tasteless? It may be tempting to answer
that phenol is bitter because it tastes bitter to a larger sub-population.
However, as Bennett points out, the numerical majority of one of the groups
seems insufficient as a motivation for relativizing to that group in fixing the
properties of phenol, since numerical majority could be achieved by either group
through mass micro-surgery or selective breeding (cf. [Bennett, 1971], chapter
IV, [McGinn, 1983], 9-10, and [Jackson and Pargetter, 1987], 71-72).
11. The Munsell color system consists of a set of color
samples (chips) used as standards in terms of which the color of test samples
can be described. The Munsell system is widely-known and widely-used in
scientific and industrial applications. Cf. [Munsell, 1946] and [Munsell Color
Company, 1976].
12. Even this apparently quite specific formulation of
standard conditions leaves out many factors relevant to the way x looks. For
example, Alan Gilchrist and his students have shown me several compelling
examples in which the perceived lightness of x at time t depends crucially on
factors such as the relative lightness of other objects seen at t, the relative
lightness of x at times earlier than t, the relative proportions of the visual
field occupied by x and objects of different lightness from x at t, and so on.
They also have cases showing that the perceived lightness of x depends on the
perceptual groups in which x is perceptually classified: the influence of the
relative lightnesses of objects in a geometrical configuration G on the
perceived lightness of x depends on the extent to which x is parsed as part of
G.
13. Perhaps this limitation is one of practice rather than
principle in certain of these cases, but it is necessarily insuperable in at
least the case of the rainbow, since rainbows are not visible from a viewing
angle of 45 degrees or 90 degrees. Therefore, assuming that we want our notions
of color to include what we see in rainbows, appealing to counterfactuals about
how things would have looked in standard conditions won't resolve this
difficulty.
14. Briefly, these conditions could assign only one of
what seem to be equally plausible candidates for the color of directionally
reflective materials, and could not assign any well-defined color to materials
whose color is dependent on use or translucent materials.
15. One natural suggestion is that the standard condition
for viewing should be defined as the point at which maximum resolution is
available. However, as Hardin points out, this strategy will fail if there is no
point of maximum resolution, which is what is suggested by the variation in size
of the receptive fields of retinal neural units ([Hardin, 1988], 71).
16. The CIE (Commission International de l'Eclairage) is
an international organization responsible for recommending standards and
procedures for light and lighting. The CIE has specified several standard
illuminants for laboratory and industrial use in terms of their relative
spectral power distributions. The most important of these are standard
illuminant A, standard illuminant B, standard illuminant C, and standard
illuminant D Metameric pairs are pairs of physically different stimuli (typically
distinguished in terms of their having different spectral reflectance
distributions or spectral power distributions) that are perceptual matches for a
given observer and a given viewing condition.
17. The members of a metameric pair can be perceptual
matches under all illuminants only if they agree in any properties assigned to
them by an intrinsic theory of color, in which case they are called isomers; but
isomers are identified in color by both intrinsic theories and ordinary
perception, so they are not challenges to the individuations made by intrinsic
accounts of color.
18. In [Hilbert, 1987], Hilbert makes the further claim
that relational theorists (he makes the argument only against dispositionalists)
are unable to describe his case adequately. [Cohen and Matthen, in preparation]
argue that the situation is precisely the opposite of what Hilbert contends: the
relationalist can provide a plausible description of the case, while Hilbert's
own description is unsatisfying. Briefly, we hold that the unpleasant choice
between the counterintuitive alternatives of saying that the surfaces are alike
in color (because they match in I1) or unlike in color (because they fail to
match in I2) only arises for one who thinks that colors are intrinsic (and
therefore that Hilbert's argument begs the question against the relationalist).
If, as per relationalism, colors are not intrinsic, but are relations to
situations, then we can hold compatibly (i) that the surfaces share a color in
I1 and (ii) the surfaces fail to share a color in I2. That is, we can respect
both of the intuitions whose rejection strikes us as unpalatable. Even if
Hilbert were correct that the denial of (ii) is more counterintuitive than the
denial of (i), surely it would be preferable to endorse both (i) and (ii), as
one can on a relational view. From this vantage point, Hilbert's response is
inferior to that of the relationalist in that it respects only half the data
supplied by intuition.
19. The material in this section draws heavily on [Cohen,
2001a], where these matters are discussed at greater length.
20. Versions of this argument occur in many places,
including ([Hardin, 1988], xxi-xxii, 66-67) and ([Thompson, 1995], 128-130,
135-139). It is also the main reason for abandoning intrinsic theories given in
([Maund, 1995], see esp. 42, 141).
21. The notion of perceptual mixing is often
operationalized in terms of subjects' ability to describe light samples as a
combination of percentages of other color names (e.g., subjects can describe
orange stimuli without using 'orange' if they are allowed to use both 'red' and
'yellow', but cannot describe yellow samples without the use of 'yellow'; cf.
([Hardin, 1988], 42) and ([Boynton, 1979], 210-211)). Similarly, Clark points
out that the set of unique colors is such that (i) mixtures of its members can
be found which will perceptually match any color, and (ii) each of its members
cannot be perceptually matched by a combination of other colors ([Clark, 1993],
126-127).
22. Hilbert has conceded the failure of his proposal in
([Byrne and Hilbert, 1997a], 285, fn. 32).
23. I have developed such a response in [Cohen, 2001a].
Proposals along somewhat similar lines are also suggested (with varying degrees
of explicitness) in ([Shoemaker, 1990], 107-108), ([Byrne and Hilbert, 1997a],
274-279), [Lewis, 1997], [Matthen, 1999], and [McLaughlin, 1999b].
24. I am deliberately leaving open the interesting
question whether the phenomenal similarities between experiences must be
understood as similarities between the intentional objects of those experiences.
On this debate, see [Harman, 1990], [Dretske, 1995], and [Block, 1996].
25. I take this claim about the structure of color
experience as the proper interpretation of the data. Of course, if the claim is
true, then it deserves explanation of its own. I believe it can be explained in
terms of the opponent-process organization of our visual systems (see [Hurvich,
1981], chapter 5). However, I'll put this matter aside for present purposes.
26. This form of response, which has been less popular in
the literature than the other alternative (but see, for example, [Ross, 1999]),
is criticized in [McGinn, 1997].
27. A similar sentiment comes out in ([Strawson, 1978],
224), and, under the rubric of `transparency,' in ([Campbell, 1993], 178ff). In
addition, some such view seems to have led G. E. Moore to insist that yellow is
a simple and indefinable quality ([Moore, 1903], 7, 10).
28. While I am sympathetic to the rejection of Revelation,
I think we are owed some sort of explanation why this thesis has seemed so
attractive -- indeed, so obvious -- to so many. Briefly, I conjecture that at
least some are tempted by Revelation because (i) they confuse instances color
properties with instances of color experiences, and (ii) their account of color
experience accords some kind of epistemic privilege to a subject's own relation
to the subjective experiences he undergoes. This (sketch of an) explanation of
the appeal of Revelation still attributes an error to proponents of that thesis,
but it locates that error by showing how it comes from views that have at least
some prima facie plausibility.
29. A similar response is offered in [Shoemaker, 1994b],
254-255.
30. [McLaughlin, 1999b] has suggested that McGinn's worry
is less problematic for functionalism than for dispositionalism (he does not,
however, use it to advocate functionalism over dispositionalism, since he thinks
the objection is ultimately ineffective against both views). According to
McLaughlin, even if the disposition to look red cannot be the direct object of
seeing (that is, even if the disposition itself is not visible), there seems no
reason to say that the property that disposes its bearers to look red cannot be
the direct object of seeing. Consequently, he suggests, functionalism can
preserve the visibility of the colors, even if dispositionalism cannot.
Unlike McLaughlin, I do not think that functionalism is any better off in
this regard than dispositionalism. First, functionalism leaves it open that the
colors --- the properties that dispose their bearers to look colored --- might
themselves be dispositions. Therefore, the threat of the invisibility of
dispositions leaves the functionalist, too, in the undesirable position of
admitting that colors might be invisible. And second, functionalism leaves it
open that colors are disjunctive (in the actual world), and we might worry that
the present objection concerning the invisibility of dispositions would apply to
disjunctions as well: one might object that, while a disjunct can be the direct
object of seeing (that it can be visible), a disjunctive property built from
that disjunct cannot.
31. The claim here is not that we see the disposition by
seeing the visual experience that is the manifestation of the disposition ---
for one need not accept that we see our visual experiences (in the direct object
sense at issue). Rather, the claim is that the visual experience itself (when it
is appropriately caused by something to which we are visually attending) is the
manifestation of the disposition, and that undergoing such a visual experience
constitutes seeing the disposition (in the direct object sense at issue).
32. See [Jackson and Pargetter, 1987], [Jackson, 1996],
and [Jackson, 1998c].
33. See, for example, the papers in the second half of
[Kim, 1993], the papers in [Heil and Mele, 1995], and [Kim, 1998].
34. [Jackson, 1998] responds to McFarland and Miller,
insisting that the kind of causal efficacy accruing to colors cannot be the
derivative sort allowed for in [Jackson and Pettit, 1988], but [McFarland and
Miller, 2000] correctly point out that this insistence is unmotivated and
question-begging in the present setting.
35. It has also ignored or treated hastily a number of
philosophical topics connected with color and color perception, including color
constancy, the ecological function of color, spectrum inversions, historically
salient views about the primary/secondary quality distinction, and the role of
color in perceptual similarity spaces, to name a few.
American Society for Testing and Materials (1968). Standard Method of
Specifying Color by the Munsell System. ASTM, Philadelphia. Designation D
1535-68.
Armstrong, D. (1968). A Materialist Theory of the Mind. Routledge,
London.
Armstrong, D. (1987). Smart and the Secondary Qualities. In Pettit, P.,
Sylvan, R. and Norman, J., Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J.
J. C. Smart. Blackwell, Oxford. Reprinted in [Byrne and Hilbert, 1997],
33-46.
Aune, B. (1967). Knowledge, Mind, and Nature. Random House, New York.
Bennett, J. (1968). Substance, reality, and primary qualities. In Martin, C.
B. and Armstrong, D. M., editors, Locke and Berkeley: A Collection of
Critical Essays, pages 86-124. Anchor Books, Garden City, New York.
Bennett, J. (1971). Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes. Clarendon
Press, Oxford.
Block, N. (1996). Mental paint and mental latex. In Villanueva, E., editor,
Philosophical Issues, volume 7. Ridgeview Publishing Company, Atascadero,
California.
Boynton, R. M. (1979). Human Color Vision. Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
New York.
Byrne, A. and Hilbert, D. R. (1997a). Colors and reflectances. In [Byrne and
Hilbert, 1997b], pages 263-288. Byrne, A. and Hilbert, D. R., editors (1997b). Readings on Color, Volume
1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Byrne, A. and Hilbert, D. R., editors (1997c). Readings on Color, Volume
2: The Science of Color. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Campbell, J. (1993). A simple view of color. In Haldane, J. and Wright, C.,
editors, Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford University
Press, New York. Reprinted in [Byrne and Hilbert, 1997b], 177-190.
Clark, A. (1993). Sensory Qualities. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Cohen, J. (2000). Color: a
functionalist proposal. Under review.
This paper elaborates and defends a functionalist analysis of color
properties, compares that view against others that have been discussed more
widely in the literature, and argues in favor of functionalism (and against
competing views).
Cohen, J. (2001a). Color and Color Space: Structural and Metrical Properties
of the Colors. Ms., University of British Columbia.
Cohen, J. (2001b). Two recent
anthologies on color. Philosophical Psychology 14(1): 118-122.
Cohen, J. (2001c). Critical study of
Stroud's The Quest for Reality. Nous, in press. Cohen, J. and Matthen, M. (in preparation). A Framework for Constructing
Colour Properties, Ms., University of British Columbia.
Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts. Originally delivered as the 1994 Jean Nicod Lectures.
Evans, R. M. (1948). An Introduction to Color. Wiley, New York.
Hardin, C. L. (1988). Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow.
Hackett, Indianapolis. Hardin, C. L. (1997). Reinverting the spectrum. In [Byrne and Hilbert,
1997b], pages 289-301. Harman, G. (1990). The intrinsic quality of experience. In Tomberlin, J.,
editor, Philosophical Perspectives: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind,
volume 4, pages 31-52. Ridgeview Publishing Company, Atascerdo, California.
Heil, J. and Mele, A., editors, (1995). Mental Causation. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Hilbert, D. R. (1987). Color and Color Perception: A Study in
Anthropocentric Realism. CSLI, Stanford.
Hurvich, L. M. (1981). Color Vision. Sinauer Associates, Sunderland,
Massachusetts. Jackson, F. (1977). Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge
University Press, New York. Jackson, F. (1996). The primary quality view of color. Philosophical
Perspectives, 10:199-219. Jackson, F. (1998c). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual
Analysis. Oxford, New York. Originally given as the 1998 Locke Lectures.
Jackson, F. (1998). Colour, disjunctions, programmes. Analysis,
58:86-88. Jackson, F. and Pargetter, R. (1987). An objectivist's guide to subjectivism
about color. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 160:127-141. Reprinted
in [Byrne and Hilbert, 1997b], 67-79. Jackson, F. and Pettit, P. (1988). Functionalism and broad content.
Mind, 97:381-400.
Johnston, M. (1992). How to talk of the colors. Philosophical Studies,
68:221-263. Reprinted in [Byrne and Hilbert, 1997b], 137-176. Judd, D. B. and Wyszecki, G. (1963). Color in Business, Science, and
Industry, Second Edition. Wiley, New York.
Kelly, K. L. and Judd, D. B. (1976). Color: Universal Language and
Dictionary of Names. National Bureau of Standards, Washington, DC. Special
Publication 440.
Kim, J. (1993). Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays.
Cambridge University Press, New York.
Kim, J. (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body
Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Originally given as the 1996 Townsend Lectures.
Lewis, D. (1997). Naming the colors. Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 75(3):325-342.
Mackie, J. L. (1976). Problems from Locke. Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human
Representation and Processing of Visual Information. W. H. Freeman, San
Francisco.
Matthen, M. (1999). The disunity of color. The Philosophical Review,
108(1): 47-84
Matthen, M. (1988). Biological functions and perceptual content. The
Journal of Philosophy, 85:5-27.
Maund, B. (1995). Colours: Their Nature and Representation. Cambridge
University Press, New York. McFarland, D. and Miller, A. (1998). Jackson on colour as a primary quality.
Analysis, 58. McFarland, D. and Miller, A., (2000). Disjunctions, programming, and the
Australian view of colour. Analysis, 60(2): 209-212. McGinn, C. (1983). The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical
Thoughts. Oxford University Press, Oxford. McGinn, C. (1996). Another look at color. The Journal of Philosophy,
93(11):537-553. McGinn, C. (1997). The appearance of color. Ms., Rutgers University. McLaughlin, B. (1999b). The place of color in nature. In Heyer and Mausfeld,
editors, From Light to Object. Oxford University Press, New York.
Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia Ethica. The University Press,
Cambridge.
Munsell, A. H. (1946). A Color Notation. Munsell Color, Baltimore.
Munsell Color Company (1976) Munsell Book of Color Munsell Color,
Baltimore.
Peacocke, C. (1984). Colour concepts and colour experiences. Synthese,
58(3):365-381. Reprinted in [Rosenthal, 1991], 408-416. Perkins, M. (1983). Sensing the World. Hackett Publishing Company,
Indianapolis.
Rosenthal, D. (1991). The Nature of Mind. Oxford University Press, New
York.
Ross, P. W. (1999). The appearance and nature of color. The Southern
Journal of Philosophy, 37: 227--252. Russell, B. (1912). The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford University
Press, London.
Shepard, R. N. (1992). "The Perceptual Organization of Colors: An Adaptation
to Regularities of the Terrestrial World?", in Barkow, J., Cosmides, L., and
Tooby, J., The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of
Culture. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 495-532. Reprinted in [Byrne
and Hilbert 1997c], 311-356.
Shoemaker, S. (1990). Qualities and qualia: What's in the Mind? Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 50, Supplement: 109-131. Reprinted in
[Shoemaker, 1996a], 97-120.
Shoemaker, S. (1994b). Self knowledge and 'inner sense'. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 54: 249-314. Reprinted in [Shoemaker, 1996a],
201-268.
Shoemaker, S. (1996a). The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Smart, J. J. C., (1975). On some criticisms of a physicalist theory of
colors. In Cheng, C., Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem.
University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu. Reprinted in [Byrne and Hilbert, 1997b],
1-10.
Strawson, G. (1978). `Red' and red. Synthese, 78:193-232.
Stroud, B. (2000). The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics
of Colour. Oxford University Press, New York. Teller D. Y. and Bornstein, M. H. (1987). Infant color vision and color
perception. In Salapatek, P. and Cohen, L., editors, Handbook of Infant
Perception. Academic Press, New York.
Thompson, E., Palacios, A., and Varela, F. (1992). "Ways of Coloring:
Comparative Color Vision as a Case Study for Cognitive Science". Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 15: 1-74.
Thompson, E. (1995). Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Science and the
Philosophy of Perception. Routledge, New York. Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory
of the Phenomenal Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Ullman, S. (1979). The Interpretation of Visual Motion. MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Wright, C. (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Wyszecki, G. and Stiles, W. S. (1967). Color Science. Wiley, New York.
The following color-related items may be of interest to readers of the
present essay.
8. References
Byrne and Hilbert argue for an intrinsic
view of color properties and an intentionalist view of color experience, and
consider several objections against these views. In particular, the paper
contains an interesting defense against the objection that colors have
structural properties that surface reflectance profiles lack and therefore that
the two cannot be identified. It also contains a novel and ingenious (albeit
fiendishly complex and, in my view, ultimately unsuccessful) response to the
objection that the possibility of spectrum inversions refutes their
intentionalism about color experience.
One of
a pair of anthologies on color -- one on the philosophy of color, and one on the
science of color. These volumes contain many of the best and most important
papers for the purposes of most philosophers, and are the obvious place to begin
one's reading on color. The two volumes are reviewed, together with another
recent anthology on color, in [Cohen, 2001b].
This is
the companion volume to [Byrne and Hilbert, 1997b], focussing on the science of
color. It contains a very useful introduction by Byrne and Hilbert, and a number
of introductory essays on various areas of color science including the physics,
colorimetry, psychophysics, and evolutionary psychology of color. This is a geat
place for philosophers to begin their study of color science. This book is
reviewed in [Cohen, 2001b].
A review
of [Stroud, 2000].
The recent explosion in philosophical interest in
color can largely be traced directly to this book, which contains an excellent
summary of then-current color science (this summary has held up remarkably well
since its publication), and shows (by example) how this material from color
science can and should be used to constrain philosophical theorizing about
color. Hardin argues for an eliminativist view of color by claiming that none of
the substantive theories satisfy the empirically-motivated requirements that he
believes theories of color must respect.
This is one of the two previously unpublished essays
in [Byrne and Hilbert, 1997b] (the other is [Byrne and Hilbert, 1997a]); Hardin
argues against the relevance of that old philosophical chestnut, the inverted
spectrum. He points out that empirical methods establish asymmetries in
psychological color space, so that any putative inversion would not go
undetected. The upshot is that undetectable inversions may be conceptually or
metaphysically possible, but they are impossible in the actual world.
Harman's piece is a classic and early statement of the increasingly popular
intentionalist/representationist conception of phenomenal experience -- the view
that the only features of our experiences of which we can be aware are features
of the intentional objects of these experiences, and not intrinsic features of
the experiences themselves. Harman argues for this view by showing how, if we
accept it, a number of otherwise troubling issues concerning phenomenal
experience will dissolve.
This excellent textbook on color vision, written by one of
the originators of contemporary opponent process theory, is unfortunately out of
print at the present time. Fortunately, the book's two chapters on chromatic and
achromatic opponency are reprinted in [Byrne and Hilbert, 1997c]. The book also
contains useful chapters on the physics of spectral radiation, the psychophysics
of color mixing, the relation of opponent process theory to retinal and cortical
electrophysiology, spatial and temporal contrast effects, color adaptation, and
several chapters on various sorts of color deficiencies. The presentations are
uniformly high in quality, and are easily understandable by the non-specialist
(e.g., the philosopher).
Jackson defends a sense-datum (representative
realist) theory of perception, according to which the direct objects of
perception are mental objects that represent things outside the head. He has
since given up this view, but his 1977 book is the clearest and most forceful
case for sense-data I have encountered.
Borrowing from [Jackson and Pargetter, 1987],
Jackson urges that we should adopt a primary quality theory of color, but one
that incorporates several important features of secondary quality theories.
Still, he argues from considerations of the causal efficacy of color to the
conclusion that colors cannot be dispositions, and therefore that we must
maintain a primary (rather than a secondary) quality theory of color.
Jackson lays out his positive case for conceptual analysis as a way of doing
serious metaphysics, and then gives us a series of examples of his methods in
chapters that treat various topics, including color. The chapter on color is
virtually identical to [Jackson, 1996].
Jackson responds to the ojection of [McFarland and Miller, 1998]
that a dispositional analysis of color could preserve the causal efficacy of
color by appeal to his own notion of program causation (from [Jackson and
Pettit, 1988]. His response is, unfortunately, little more than an insistence
that the causal efficacy of color demands more than program causation -- he
claims that colors could not be the causes of color experiences (which, of
course, they are) unless they were causally efficacious in a non-derivative
sense. I cannot find in the piece any convincing arguments in support of this
claim.
Jackson and Pargetter want to defend
the "Australian view" that colors are objective primary qualities as against a
dispositionalist conception of colors as subjective secondary qualities.
However, they find that there are many attractive features of dispositionalist
views that they want to incorporate into their own account; their project is to
show how an objectivist about color can capture the attractive features of
subjectivist views without conceding entirely to the subjectivist. The view they
end up with is, in this respect, a kind of middle ground between positions that
many had previously suspected exhausted the logical space of options.
This is a long
and difficult essay in defense of color dispositionalism, but it repays close
study. Johnston argues that, while no plausible theory can respect all of the
core truths about color we might have hoped to preserve, a dispositionalist view
is closer to meeting this goal than some have alleged. In particular, Johnston
defends dispositionalism against several leading objections (several of which
have to do with the metaphysics of dispositions, rather than with color per se),
and then argues that dispositionalism should be preferred over a "primary
quality view" because only the former secures a kind of acquaintance with the
colors that we should value.
Maund argues that our color concepts are
"virtual" -- that they place a number of constraints on would-be satisfiers that
are, as it happens, not jointly satisfied by anything. These constraints, which
Maund thinks are analytically required of anything that deserves to count as a
color, are not incompatible, but are simply not all satisfied by anything in the
actual world. The upshot is that our color concepts might have been satisfied
(by colors), but in fact are not satisfied; this is just to say that there are
no colors in the actual world (although, to be sure, things look colored in the
actual world).
McFarland and Miller find a striking irony in Frank
Jackson's views on color and causation. On the one hand, [Jackson, 1996] argues
against dispositional views of color on the ground that colors must be causally
efficacious and that dispositions are causally inert. On the other hand,
[Jackson and Pettit, 1988] have argued that higher level properties can have a
causal efficiacy that is derivative on the causal efficacy of their lower level
realizers: on this view, the higher level property can figure in causal
explanations by "programming" for the presence of some or other low level
realizer. The question McFarland and Miller pose to Jackson, then, is why a
dispositionalist about color might not secure the causal efficacy of colors (qua
dispositions) in terms of a higher level, derivative relation such as program
causation.
[Jackson, 1998]
responded to [McFarland and Miller, 1998] by insisting that the causal relation
between colors and color experiences could not be a derivative relation such as
program causation, but had to be understood as a non-derivative kind of
causation. Unsurprisingly, McFarland and Miller find this response
question-begging, and remain unconvinced.
McGinn never argues
explicitly for a dispositional treatment of color in this book. Instead he
assumes such an account and then goes on to note a number of interesting
consequences of the view. Among them are several ways in which colors count as
subjective properties, and ways in which such subjective properties share
important features with indexical thoughts.
Here McGinn argues against the dispositional account of
color he had taken largely for granted in [McGinn, 1983]. He launches a number
of interrelated objections against dispositionalism, but many of them concern
the worry that dispositionalism is inadequate to the phenomenology of color as
we experience it.
The
repudiation of the dispositionalism of [McGinn, 1983] that occurs in [McGinn,
1996] turns on discrepancies between dispositionalism and the phenomenology of
color. One possible response to this objection, of course, is to hold that,
since color phenomenology is uncommitted about the nature of color ontology,
color phenomenology is by itself incapable of telling us anything (true and)
informative about colors. [McGinn, 1997] takes on this response, urging that
color phenomenology must be intimately tied up with color properties.
Peacocke's question
is one of conceptual piority. Must our concept of red be explained in terms of
our concept of red experience? Or should the dependence go in the opposite
direction? Or is neither concept prior to the other? Peacocke plumps for the
first view -- the view that our concept of red experience is prior to our
concept of red. In particular, he is attracted by a dispositionalist analysis
according to which the concept of red is unpacked as the concept of some sort of
disposition to affect perceivers.
Ross hold a view he calls 'color
physicalism', according to which colors are intrinsic and "physical properties
of physical objects". Many authors have resisted this sort of view because of
considerations involving, in one way or another, the way color appears to us and
others like us (or unlike us). Ross responds to all of these arguments by
holding that the appearance of color is an inadequate guide to the nature of
color, and suggests that the arguments against the view he favors depend on
untenable assumptions about the revelatory character of color appearance with
respect to color.
In this book, Stroud
argues against relationalist and irrealist views of color. Especially
interesting is his transcendental argument against color irrealism: he argues
not that color irrealism is false, but that a rational inquirer could never
convince herself of its truth by rational means. [Cohen, 2001c] is a critical
study of this book.
Thompson's "enactive"
view of color vision understands colors in terms of the ecologically described
biological functions performed by the visual systems of different organisms.
Although Thompson claims that his view is a distinct alternative to both
traditional "objectivist" and "subjectivist" views, it is arguable that the
enactive understanding of color amounts to a species of dispositionalism.
This book
is an extremely well-written defense of an intentional view of phenomenal
consciousness -- it proposes to analyze conscious sensations exclusively in
terms of the representational content. Since Tye also believes that
representational content is susceptible of a naturalistic treatment, this would
clear the way for a naturalistic conception of consciousness. As the title
suggests, it presents the view through the consideration of ten problems
concerning phenomenal consciousness; Tye's burden is to show that his account
solves these problems more successfully than competing accounts.
9. Links
If you know of other relevant sources on the web, please let
me know!