

Introduction

Philosophy and Philosophising

In his book *Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie*, Wolfgang Stegmüller distinguishes three different kinds of practising philosophy: expand gain acquire

Philosophy as *Weltanschauung*. The aim is either to replace religion or at least to give some advice to master the difficulties of life. (Marxism, Existentialism)

Philosophy as science that aims to acquire theoretical knowledge, either independent on the natural sciences or expending them and approaching a kind of overall view or „Gesamtschau“ (Brentano, Husserl, Hartmann, Schelers)


Philosophy as investigation of the fundamentals of the empirical and theoretical sciences ([Einzelwissenschaften](#)) ([Wiener Kreis](#) and analytical philosophy)

Das Resultat der Philosophie sind nicht „philosophische Sätze“, sondern das Klarwerden von Sätzen. [Ludwig Wittgenstein](#)

Main Stream 1

Within the present Analytical Philosophy there are three main streams. The first two are dominated by the idea to analyze the language of science. The third is characterized by the radical idea of reducing philosophical problems by the insights of natural sciences.

Logical analysis of the language of science
(Russell, Carnap, Goodman, Quine, Putnam)



Rudolf Carnap

Understanding the expressive means of the language of science by providing a mathematically precise logical analysis of that language. Critical reflections about certain „philosophical sentences“ that can be rejected as [Schein-problems of Science](#).

Main Stream 2

Ordinary Language Philosophy
(Moore, Wittgenstein, [Ryle](#), Austin
u.a Anhänger der Oxforder Schule)



Ludwig Wittgenstein

Investigating the language of philosophy by analyzing the corresponding common sense expressions in natural language („meaning“)


Alle Philosophie ist "Sprachkritik".

Philosophie ist nichts anderes als ein ständiger Kampf gegen die Verhexung unseres Verstandes durch die Mittel unserer Sprache. (Ludwig Wittgenstein)

Main Stream 3

Philosophy of Mind

(Dretske, Fodor, Putnam, Searle, Churchland, Maturana & Varela)



John R. Searle

The ultimate goal is the „Naturalization" of Epistemology. That means that we try to eliminate certain philosophical problems by reducing it to solvable problems within the empirical sciences (relevant in this respect is Cognitive Science: Cognitive Psychology, Computational Intelligence, Theoretical Linguistics, Evolutionary Biology etc.)

Some critics don't believe that this is possible.

Aims of this Lecture

- Clarification of important notions such as mind, mental state, truth, representation, meaning, knowledge, intention, consciousness
- Clarification of important connections and interactive relationships:
 - mind & body
 - representation & consciousness
 - truth & meaning
 - language & thinking
 - language & experience.
- The boundaries of naturalization. Are there any?
- Philosophical Illusions (free will; gap between mind and body, ...)

We will try to find consistent solutions for the raised problems without being fixed on *one* philosophical paradigm.

The General Attitude

- Naturalist approach: It is believed that empirical considerations, where possible, should play a role in philosophical research
- Depending on the topic the approach is multidisciplinary sometimes. The disciplines most frequently used are: the cognitive sciences including Evolution Theory, Computer Science, and Anthropology
- The importance of the notion of the rationality of scientific practices. What are our reasons for believing in the (theoretical) entities postulated by scientific and philosophical theories
- The importance of ontology and the rationality of ontological decisions

The philosophy of mind is continuous with metaphysics as traditionally conceived (John Heil, p. 7)

The Issue of Rationality

- What reasons do scientists have to believe in theoretical entities in science?
- Idea 1: Inference to the best explanation. Looking for coherent theories.
- Idea 2: The Principle of Small Chances:
“We may reasonably neglect that p when the chance that p is very small”.
An example is the rejection of the “ether theory”.
- What reasons do philosophers have to believe in certain ontological categories?
[One advantage of John Heil’s book is that it addresses this issue]
- What has a philosopher to offer the scientists who work in the area of Cognitive Science?

A look ahead

Part 1

John Heil: Philosophy of Mind. Routledge, London & New York

Cartesian dualism and a guided tour of the most prominent reactions to this view, both idealistic and materialistic (including behaviourist, functionalist, interpretationist, and eliminativist accounts). This is the destructive part.

Part 2

The second part is more constructive. Using original articles it explains the mental realm in more detail (concepts, meanings; representations and their content), it takes a closer look to computer functionalism and it debates the issue of consciousness. Furthermore, it considers the current debate between connectionists and symbolists and it considers an issue in the philosophy of language: the relation between language and experience.