Mind & Body
Overview

Philosophy of mind is characterized by three groups of problems:

- What is a creature with a mind (with mentality). What conditions must be satisfied? Can computers think?

- What are the relationships between mind and body? What are the relationships between mental and physical properties? (The mind-body problem)

- Properties that concern specific mental properties or mental states.
  - What are concepts, meanings, beliefs, representations?
  - What constitutes the connection between certain mental states and content?
  - What is consciousness? What are conscious mental states?
  - What are symbolic concepts, representations, and mental states?

The Naïve Picture



Naïve questions

Obviously, there are correlations within the inner and the outer world, and between them.

- What is the basis of the correlation in the outer world?
- What is the basis of the correlation in the inner world?
- What is the basis of the correlation between inner and outer world?

Examples for two different ways correlations may arise in the outer world

A look ahead (Part 1 of the lecture)

- Cartesian dualism and its problems
- Idealist's responses (very short)
- Materialist's responses

1. Behaviourism (minds as dispositions of behaviour)
2. The theory of psychophysical identity (=Identity Theory)
3. Functionalism (including computer functionalism)
4. Interpretational theories (Dennett's intentional stance)
5. Eliminativism (folk psychology is wrong)

Some distinctions 1: Primary and secondary qualities

Does a tree falling in the forest make a sound when no one is around to hear it?

Answer 1: Yes, of course. The tree's falling creates sound waves that radiate outwards in a spherical way.

Sound$_e$ as a physical property of the outer event of falling

Answer 2: No, if you mean "heard noise" by *sound*, the tree is falling silent.

Sound$_i$ as the *experienced sound*, as a projected property

Qualities of the first kind are called primary qualities, qualities of the second kind are called secondary qualities. *This tree is **green*** is expressing a secondary quality, and *this tree is **20 meter high*** is expressing a primary quality. (Natural language doesn't reflect that!)

What is the difference between primary and secondary qualities?

Primary Qualities	*Secondary Qualities*
Properly belonging to the material world	Properly belonging to the mental world
Very direct, 1 - 1 correspondence between the physical properties and their mental reflex (under normal conditions)	Very indirect correspondence between the eliciting physical properties and the induced kind of experience (even under normal conditions)
Mass, spatial characteristics (shape, size, surface texture, motions)	Colour, taste, smell, sound$_i$

The problem of secondary qualification

What is the precise connection between a bundle of primary qualifications and the elicited secondary qualification?

Distribution of the light waves that affects region A of the retina
Distribution for the surrounding area B



Colour awareness, e.g.
Area *A* is red

the problem is complicated, already for colours:

- No simple psycho-physical function
- The mapping is many-to-one, e.g. 590 μμ ⇒ **yellow**; 760 μμ + 535 μμ ⇒ **yellow**
- Some colours cannot realized by a monochromatic light (pink, crimson, gold, brown)
- Colours are not absolute. Context-dependence.

The influence of context





Excurse to the world of colour

Although colour is of interest in its own right, in philosophy it mainly serves as a tractable example that can be used to investigate problems of more general scope. One reason why colour is particularly suitable for these purposes is that a great deal is known about the relevant physical properties of objects, and the way in which colour information is extracted and processed.

The importance of the problem of secondary qualification





The properties of the mind are secondary qualities of the brain

Some distinctions 2: intrinsic vs. observer-dependent properties

This distinction is due to Searle (1992): *The rediscovery of he mind*

- Intrinsic properties of an object exist independently of the observer.
  Examples: Having a certain mass, having a certain colour (yes, certain secondary qualities are intrinsic, since we can investigate them by the objective methods of experimental psychology)

- Observer-dependent properties of an object are relative to a certain observer or user. The observer assigns the property by deciding to interpret the object in this way.
  Examples: being a bath-tub, a chair, a table (functional concepts).

Schrödinger's principle of objectivation: In modern science, the observer isn't part of the investigated domain. He is a kind of viewer only. Consequence: modern science is exclusively resting on *intrinsic concepts* (exception: quantum mechanics)

Classification

According to Searle it is one of the difficult tasks of philosophy to explain which properties are intrinsic and which properties are observer-dependent.

	Intrinsic	**Observer-dependent**
primary	Having a certain mass, form, texture Certain chemical and electrical activity in the brain	Being a washing machine, a bath tub, a chair, a table, a flip-flop unit
secondary	Having a certain colour Having consciousness, intentions, plans etc.	Being a computational system, a information processing system, a digital computer

Often consciousness is taken as observer-dependent and being a computational system as intrinsic. This is – according to Searle – a deep mistake.

Some distinctions 3: intrinsic vs. extrinsic (relational) qualities

This distinction is due to Heil (1992), p.65:

- An intrinsic qualities is a quality an object has in its own right, independently of the relations the object has to other objects.
  Examples: Having a certain mass, having a particular form, having a particular colour

- An extrinsic (relational) quality is possessed only in virtue of relations that object bears to other objects.
  Examples: Spatial relations like being close to another object, dispositional properties (soluble x: supposed x is in water y, then x dissolves in water y)

According to some doctrines (behaviourism, functionalism) mental states lack an intrinsic qualitative nature.